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IN THE BEFORE W.L. RITTER C.L. SCOVEL E.E. GEISER |
UNITED STATES
v.
Robert T. RATLIFF
Yeoman Third Class (E-4),
NMCCA 200102020 Decided
22 November 2005
Sentence adjudged
29 June 2000. Military Judge: J.P. Winthrop. Review
pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, of Special Court-Martial convened by
Commanding Officer, USS NIMITZ
(CVN 68).
WILLIAM E.
CASSARA, Civilian Appellate Defense Counsel
Maj ANTHONY
WILLIAMS, USMC, Appellate Defense Counsel
LT BRIAN MIZER,
JAGC, USNR, Appellate Defense Counsel
LT DEBORAH MAYER,
JAGC, USNR, Appellate Government Counsel
Capt GLEN HINES,
USMC, Appellate Government Counsel
AS
AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION, THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT.
PER CURIAM:
A special court-martial, composed of
officer and enlisted members, convicted the appellant, contrary to his pleas,
of conspiracy and larceny, in violation of Articles 81 and 121, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881 and 921.
The members sentenced the appellant to confinement for 75 days,
reduction to pay grade E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved the adjudged
sentence.
The appellant asserts three assignments of
error: the evidence is factually and legally insufficient to support his
convictions; the Government’s loss or destruction of the key piece of evidence
mandates reversal; and the failure of the military judge to instruct the
members on the defense of mistake was not harmless error.
We have carefully considered the record of
trial, the appellant’s three assignments of error, and the Government’s
response. We construe the appellant’s
argument in his second assignment of error to be that the record of trial is incomplete
due to a substantial omission, and that he is prejudiced by that omission. We agree, and grant relief in our decretal
paragraph.
A “complete record of the proceedings and
testimony” must be prepared for every special court-martial in which the
adjudged sentence includes a bad-conduct discharge. Art. 54(c)(1)(B), UCMJ. “A ‘complete record’ is not necessarily a
‘verbatim record.’” United States v.
McCullah, 11 M.J. 234, 236 (C.M.A. 1981)(quoting United States v.
Whitman, 11 C.M.R. 179, 181 (C.M.A. 1953)).
The Constitution does not require a verbatim record of a criminal
trial.
In this case, Prosecution Exhibits 3 and 4
are missing from the record of trial.
The appellant submitted a motion to compel their production, which we
granted. Despite “exhaustive searches”
conducted by the Trial Service Office and the convening authority, however, the
Government was unable to find the missing exhibits.
The
missing exhibits constituted critical evidence for the prosecution in this
conspiracy and shoplifting case. They
were videotapes recorded by surveillance cameras in the Post Exchange at
The prosecution built its case on the
videotapes. In his opening statement,
the trial counsel told the members:
[Detective
P] followed [the appellant] throughout the
store
that entire time, and because she did, you’re
going
to have an opportunity to view the accused in
that
store as well. . . .
[Description
of the appellant’s actions]
And
you’re going to see about 90% of this.
The only thing
you’re
not going to see on that videotape is him right—
actually
at the cashier, because Detective [P] had walked
out
into the main store area to wait for him so she
wouldn’t
have to chase him down. . . .
.
. . .
Members,
they say that a picture is worth a thousand words.
The
government is going to show you a thousand pictures
that
add up to one very important word, in this case. That
word
is larceny.
In his closing argument, the trial counsel
referred repeatedly to the videotapes and recounted for the members what they
observed on them. He linked the contents
of the tapes to the elements of both the conspiracy and the larceny
charges. He concluded by telling the
members, “You watched this tape. You
know exactly what happened. . . . ”
After closing arguments, the military judge
and counsel conducted an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session. The military judge expressed reluctance to
include the videotapes with the evidence to be given to the members for their
use during deliberations. The trial
counsel analogized the tapes to photographs and argued that they should be
given to the members or that the members should be told that they may view the
tapes again, if they wished to do so.
The defense counsel argued that the members should not be permitted to
review the tapes as part of their deliberations. The military judge finally concluded that the
tapes themselves would be given to the members with the other exhibits, and
that a television would be provided if the members asked to review the
tapes.
In this case, the trial counsel focused
attention in memorable fashion on the videotapes of the appellant’s actions in
the store. Apart from Detective [P]’s
narration of the videotapes, which also includes her interpretation of some of
the actions of the appellant and his alleged co-conspirator, she provided only
cursory testimony regarding her observations of the appellant. The members thought the videotapes so
important that they sought to review them immediately upon beginning
deliberations. We conclude that their
omission from the record is substantial, raising a presumption of prejudice to
the appellant. The Government attempts
to rebut that presumption through argument in its brief. That effort, however, falls short. These exhibits formed the centerpiece of the
prosecution’s case and we know that, like the members at trial, we would
inevitably turn to them in our review of the findings of guilty. We find that the Government has failed to
rebut the presumption that the appellant is prejudiced by the omission of the
tapes from the record. See
We may affirm only such findings of guilty
and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence as we find correct in
law and fact and determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved. Art. 66(c), UCMJ. The fact that these exhibits are missing
prevents us from reviewing the evidence presented to the members and determining
whether the evidence they considered was legally and factually sufficient to
support the appellant’s conviction. See
Art. 66(d), UCMJ;
Our
decision makes consideration of the appellant’s remaining assignments of error
and oral argument (granted in our order of 8 July 2004) unnecessary. The findings and the sentence are set
aside. The record is returned to the
Judge Advocate General for remand to an appropriate convening authority. A rehearing may be ordered. If a rehearing is not ordered, the charges
and specifications shall be dismissed.
For the Court
R.H. TROIDL
Clerk of Court